The video below reveals the vast Russia-spanning logistical capacity of the Russian military:
Here is a quick look ot the problems Russia confronted when moving its war machine into Ukraine:
- Ukrainian forces destroyed all rail links between the two countries.
- Russian forces are relying on analog, unsecured radio communications rather than scrambled digital channels, and Ukrainian forces are listening in and jamming.
- Poor logistics also helped Soviet forces lose in Afghanistan.Russia has 30,000 strong military rail organization.“Russia doesn’t have enough trucks.” They can’t operate effectively more than 90 miles from supply dumps.
- A large percentage of truck transport was dedicated to rocket resupply, not fuel and food.
- Russia only had 3-5 days of supplies when they invaded. When those ran out, they were screwed.
- Russia’s military works on a “push” logistic system rather than a “pull” system used by the U.S. military, mean it’s not very flexible.
- Russia has the capability to set up the infrastructure for a longer war, but it’s going to take time.
- Russia’s failure to quickly achieve it’s objectives has seen it resort to more desperate and indiscriminate tactics. __ via Battleswarm
It has been calculated that each day of the invasion is costing Russia more than $20bn. The campaign may, in the end, expire from the haemorrhage of cash. But equally, if not more damaging to its prospects, may be the disenchantment of Putin’s conscripts. The more these troops are exposed to the raking fire and hostility of the Ukrainians, the more confused they will become. Napoleon is said to have estimated that the success of any campaign was one-quarter attributable to numbers and material and three-quarters to morale. If that holds good in Ukraine, the troubles facing Putin are just beginning. The long-term occupation, which is the only possible alternative to the failed blitzkrieg, will add to the numbers of young men returning to Russia hideously wounded or in body bags, as an intractable insurgency takes hold. __ Mr. Putin’s War Plan
Russian failures are not limited, however, to logistics. At the tactical level, the Russian army seems to have lost the ability to do the basic tasks well. From regular maintenance to discipline in security and tactical formations, videos coming from the conflict are rife with examples of Russian soldiers lacking the lowest level skills required for survival and mobility, let alone the complexities of combined arms maneuver. Operationally, they have lacked synchronization and have often allowed early successes to be squandered by culminating too soon or through a failure to exploit those successes. The initial air assault seizure of Antonov Airfield by the Russian air forces on the first day of the war, already poorly conceived through a daylight infiltration that lost several aircraft, was wasted by a failure to flow in follow-on forces. Subsequent fighting over the airfield has tied down and destroyed several Russian elements rather than truly opening a major hub for operations against Kyiv.
Of course, Russia’s problems have a compounding nature. Vehicles out of fuel on the road to Kyiv become easy targets. Destroyed vehicles become obstacles to further resupply of fuel and food. Hungry soldiers desert their vehicles looking for food. And on and on it goes.NLM
The Russian air forces have displayed a surprising inability to suppress Ukrainian air defences and Ukrainian air power. Part of the problem is the failure of the early bombardment to find critical Ukrainian assets — which had been moved at the last moment before the attack. But part of the problem is that Russian jet engines have been unreliable, ever since 2014 when Putin’s prolonged invasion of Ukraine was actually begun. A dirty secret of the Russian weapons complex is that the Russian military needed Ukrainian turbine engines to function. The shift to Russian production after the stupid alienation of Ukraine in 2014, has not lived up to expectations.
On the first day of the invasion, an anticipated series of large-scale Russian air operations in the aftermath of initial cruise- and ballistic-missile strikes did not materialise. An initial analysis of the possible reasons for this identified potential Russian difficulties with deconfliction between ground-based surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries, a lack of precision-guided munitions and limited numbers of pilots with the requisite expertise to conduct precise strikes in support of initial ground operations due to low average VKS flying hours. These factors all remain relevant, but are no longer sufficient in themselves to explain the anaemic VKS activity as the ground invasion continues into its second week. Russian fast jets have conducted only limited sorties in Ukrainian airspace, in singles or pairs, always at low altitudes and mostly at night to minimise losses from Ukrainian man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) and ground fire.RUSI
I am struck by the small-minded bitterness of those who try to justify the Russian rape and murder of women and children in Ukraine. Mr. Putin’s provocation to war in Ukraine was simply that he thought he could get away with it — the same reasoning of any vile criminal who attacks what he perceives as weakness.
It is clear that Mr. Putin has no conscience and no shame. It is becoming clear that most of his defenders likewise lack in those basic human traits. That is unfortunate, but not particularly surprising in the grand scheme of things.
We can take this tragic interlude of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine as a reminder of the evil that lurks in the minds of the power-mad thugs who rule too many nations of the Earth. It is this kind of dark low-life malignancy that will eventually push more thinkers to conclude that humans cannot rule themselves, that some form of superhuman intelligence such as an advanced machine intelligence, is required.
That would be a mistake.
But for Russia today, a machine intelligence that promoted cooperation and harmonious interaction, would be a distinct improvement over what they have now. But first, they will need to take out the garbage in the Kremlin.
More: Poroshenko Appeals for Airplanes
Communications between Moscow and its various Ukrainian fronts are apparently not what they should be. Supply lines are long and tenuous, and mass desertions have been a problem.